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Abstract 
This paper responds to, and comments on, Coulter’s (1999) critique of discursive psychology 
with particular reference to how cognition is conceptualised theoretically and analytically.  It 
first identifies a number of basic misreadings of discursive psychological writings, which 
distort and, at times, reverse its position on the status of cognition.  Second, it reviews the 
main ways in which cognition, mental states, and thoughts have been analytically 
conceptualised in discursive psychology (respecification of topics from mainstream 
psychology, studies of the psychological thesaurus in action, and studies of the way 
psychological issues are managed).  Third, it considers two of Coulter’s substantive issues: 
the role of correct usage and the role of conceptual vs. empirical analysis.  A series of 
problems are identified with Coulter’s development of both of these issues.   
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We have admired Jeff Coulter’s work for some time.  It has provided an important counter to 
cognitivist thinking in psychology, and has effectively shown the value of Wittgensteinian 
and ethnomethodological argument in this domain.  We were, therefore, disappointed by the 
failure of his discussion of discursive psychology (Coulter, 1999: 163-81) to live up to his 
usual scholarly standards.  We were disposed to ignore the article’s major errors and hope 
that more constructive discussion would develop elsewhere.  However, we have encountered 
a range of informal and semi-formal references to the paper as providing a definitive account, 
and dismissal, of discursive psychology.  The situation thus needs clarification.  This 
becomes particularly urgent as some linkages (again informal and semi-formal) have been 
made with the Billig-Wetherell-Schegloff debate (Billig, 1999a,b; Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 
1999a,b; Wetherell, 1998).  The risk is that, when taken together, an entirely misleading 
version of the nature of discursive psychology will gain currency with people who might 
otherwise have found it relevant to their own work.  We hope that the critical tone we must 
adopt here will not distract from what we still see as a basically collegial and communal task. 
In this commentary we restrict ourselves to Coulter’s (1999) paper.  There are three 
themes.  First, we identify a range of basic misreadings of discursive psychology.  These do 
not only distort, but at times reverse our position, so it is important to correct them.  Second, 
we briefly review some of the key features of discursive psychology and its approach to 
mental
1
 states, cognitions, thoughts and so on.  Third, we consider some of the broader issues 
that Coulter raises, particularly with respect to the status of empirical work. 
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Coulter’s Misreading 
The theoretical and analytic terrain where social constructionist thinking overlaps with 
discourse analysis, discursive psychology, sociolinguistics, conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodology is a complicated one.  It can be a daunting task, picking a way through this 
thinking.  Positions with similar names or even, sometimes, the same name, may have very 
different approaches to method and theory in general and to the nature of “mind” in 
particular.  This plainly makes scholarship in this area difficult, but the onus is therefore even 
more on writers to make sure they are getting things right. 
One problem with Coulter’s review article is that it covered a range of quite different 
work that has used terms such as “discursive psychology” and “social construction”, 
including our own writings and also those of Rom Harré and others.  It is not always clear 
which target Coulter has in his sights, but some of his general glosses on “discursive 
psychology” as a whole (if indeed it is “a whole” in anything other than name) are clearly 
applicable to Harré’s work rather than ours.  We intend here to allow Harré to argue his own 
corner, and to pursue what Coulter has to say about our own programme. 
Coulter’s basic mistake is to treat discursive psychology, as we have developed it, as 
an ontological position which explains how an actual thing, mind, is produced through 
discursive construction and, moreover, something revealed through talk: 
a thesis which proposes that the human mind and its various properties are generated 
in and through discourse: in essence, the “mind” is revealed in and through analysable 
features of the things that people say and do through their talk, especially through 
their talk about the mental (Coulter, 1999: 163, original emphasis). 
This is simply wrong.  However applicable it might be to work by Harré, or more obviously 
by constructionist psychologists such as Vygotsky, Bruner or Piaget, it is at odds with the 
many published statements we have made about our work, including statements in books 
reviewed by Coulter, and it is also entirely inconsistent with the way the approach is 
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developed in research practice.  For us the question is how could Coulter have got it so 
wrong? 
With respect to his discussion of our book Discursive Psychology (Edwards & Potter, 
1992) one of the main problems is that he confuses our critical targets with our own position.  
Near the start of the book we make some observations about theoretical differences between 
cognitivist and social constructionist researchers.  We do this precisely to mark out the 
difference from a discursive psychological approach: 
it is not our intention in this book to develop these [cognitive and social 
constructionist] sorts of arguments.  Here we intend to bracket, or set aside, the issue 
of reductionism and origins in favour of an orientation to method and analysis.  That 
is, our concern will be to examine how participants in talk address the kinds of 
concerns that cognitive and social psychologists have raised (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 
19). 
Yet Coulter quotes from just four paragraphs before this, where we are glossing one of the 
two groupings that we are distinguishing ourselves from, and treats it as our position. 
It is worth re-quoting part of Coulter’s own quotation of us, along with his gloss, to 
give a flavour of both his mistake and the vigour with which he is pursuing it.  He writes: 
They write: 
Cognitive processes [sic.], on this [social-constructionist-JC] view, are not the 
springs of human sense and action, however much our everyday concepts of 
mind may get to be refined [sic.] by experimental psychology and cognitive 
science.  Rather they are ideas generated within cultures, conceptions of sense, 
action and motive [sic.] that people invent to mediate their dealings with each 
other, to engage in social forms of life. (…) 
This passage already concedes far too much: it concedes the existence of putative 
“cognitive processes” (whose nature is left unspecified), as well as the contentious 
notion that theoretical psychologists can “refine” our “everyday concepts of” the 
mental.  Exactly how this procedure might work is also neither specified nor 
defended. (Coulter, 1999: 164.  The bracketed insertions are all Coulter’s). 
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Let us make a number of observations about what is going on here.  In reporting two 
positions (cognitivism and social constructionism), we are not thereby committing ourselves 
to them.  Rather the contrary, we were in the first chapter of a book that developed some 
rather different views!  This is a pretty conventional way of starting a book.  In reporting a 
view on cognitive processes, we are not thereby committed to the existence (or not) of such 
things.  Nor did we endorse the idea that experimental psychologists are actually “refining 
everyday concepts” – that was the sense of “however much”, that we were setting aside that 
assumption as outside of the argument at that point.  In fact, much of the book is precisely 
raising questions about such claims and assumptions. 
Further, given that the terms “cognitive processes”, “refined”, and “motive” are a 
central part of the discussion, it seems odd that their very use is dubbed erroneous by Coulter.  
The sprinkling of “sics” at the mere use of those words, as if listing glaring errors, is merely 
annoying. Many of the words at which Coulter pokes his tongue in this way appear in our 
glosses on others’ views, or as the very terms under examination.  Indeed, he uses them 
frequently himself and, quite properly, not always inside scare quotes.  It would be easy, if 
equally pernicious, to quote Coulter on “the rules of use of the mental predicates” (ibid.: 167) 
and simply insert “[sic]” after “mental”, as if somehow catching him out. 
Given that Coulter is confusing our report of a social constructionist perspective with 
our own argument, it is perhaps not surprising that he goes on to use our report of the kinds of 
counter arguments that cognitive psychologists use against it, as a counter argument against 
us.  Yet it might surely have given him pause to wonder why we were explicitly and 
cheerfully “selling out the anti-Cartesian and anticognitivist position” (Coulter, 1999: 164) in 
that way.  The answer (as we have already quoted) is right there a few lines later: we were 
attempting to develop an approach that was not susceptible to those critiques.  At this point in 
the book we confessed some past use of the kind of social constructionist arguments from 
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which we then wished to distance ourselves; a point that Coulter quotes, as if we were 
continuing with those arguments.  We could cite more confusions of this kind, but we hope 
that these are sufficient to make the point. 
Coulter treats all bracketing-off of mental issues to be a concession of the 
“ontological status attributed to the ‘mental’ and the ‘cognitive’”, and therefore an 
undercutting of the chance of being “taken at all seriously” (Coulter, 1999: 165).  In one 
sense this is an issue of rhetoric (and no less important for that).  We have been attempting to 
engage cognitive psychologists and social cognitive psychologists in constructive debate for 
some time.  Starting our book off with an assertion that their favoured topics of study simply 
do not exist is not likely to foster productive debate, even when it is backed up by citations of 
great philosophers such as Wittgenstein.  Note that generating such a dialogue has not 
committed us to “theoretical dilution” or “Cartesian concessions”.  Indeed, we are more 
commonly accused of extremism or obstinacy! 
Let us move on to Coulter’s discussion of Edwards (1997).  As Coulter notes this is a 
more advanced treatment of the issues.  Several years of further thinking and research have 
gone into it. It is therefore somewhat surprising that it is not taken as the more up to date and 
definitive guide.  No matter.  The gloss on this work continues the misunderstandings of the 
earlier one, and compounds them with new ones.  Again it is worth quoting both the quote 
and the gloss: 
Mind and reality are treated analytically as discourse’s topics and business, the 
stuff the talk is about, and the analytic task is to examine how participants 
descriptively construct them (Edwards, 1997: 48) 
The problem with such a formulation is that it restricts the appeal to ordinary 
language conceptualisation to that which is revealed only in a fully topical and 
explicit manner: the “mental” is thus to be construed solely in terms of what people 
say about it (Coulter, 1999: 166). 
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We fail to see the restriction that Coulter identifies.  Indeed, insofar as discursive psychology 
is a programme, analysis of practices using mental words is just one of its elements.  We will 
say more about this shortly, but it is not something that is hard to discover.  For example a 
considerable part of the 1992 book, of which Coulter is so critical, re-works psychologists’ 
technical categories of memory and attribution in terms of descriptions of events, actions, 
people and, sometimes, mind.
2
  Very little of this is direct talk about mental states (however 
construed); it is mostly event descriptions, uses of categories and narrative devices, ways of 
implicating, handling or managing common sense psychological concerns (such as motive, 
memory, intentions) rather than “talking about” them.  It starts to become difficult to believe 
that Coulter has actually read the book. 
Coulter goes on to say this about discourse, as part of a contrast with the notion of 
language games: 
Discourse, however, while indeed it obviously involves the deployment of concepts, 
is more generally understood in these texts as “talk about…X”, whether X is a mental 
or any other “topic”.  Discourse is, within linguistics, a trans-sentential unit of the use 
of language (Coulter, 1999: 166).  
Let us put on one side the claim about concepts, which is potentially a major source of 
confusion given their typical cognitivist interpretation in psychology, and it was to academic 
psychology that our arguments were addressed.  The odd thing is the claim that “these texts” 
(ours?) understand discourse as “talk about…X”.  This may be true of some more 
Foucaultian inspired discourse work; but ours is more influenced by linguistic philosophy, 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis.  We have explicitly contrasted our work with 
the linguistic take on discourse as “trans-sentential units”.  Again, Coulter seems to take 
everything called “discourse analysis”, which is a notoriously heterogeneous and unrelated 
collection of approaches, as covering the same things.  It is an ironically odd, referential 
notion of what words mean, for him to have fallen into. 
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At the start of Discursive Psychology we gave a gloss that is worth repeating, 
although with added emphasis to highlight Coulter’s failure to adequately capture what we 
suggested: 
The focus of discursive psychology is the action orientation of talk and writing.  For 
both participants and analysts, the primary issue is the social actions, or interactional 
work, being done in the discourse.  But rather than focussing on the usual concerns of 
social interactional analyses, such as the way social and intergroup relationships are 
conducted (through forms of address, speech accommodation, etc.), or how “speech 
acts” might be identified, the major concern in this book is epistemological.  It is with 
the nature of knowledge, cognition and reality: with how events are described and 
explained, how factual reports are constructed, how cognitive states are attributed.  
These are defined as discursive topics, things people topicalize or orient themselves 
to, or imply, in their discourse.  And rather than seeing such discursive constructions 
as expressions of speakers’ underlying cognitive states, they are examined in the 
context of their occurrence as situated and occasioned constructions whose precise 
nature makes sense, to participants and analysts alike, in terms of the social actions 
those descriptions accomplish (1992: 2, emphasis added). 
Coulter goes on to pick out further quotes from Edwards (1997) with the aim of showing that 
it involves an inherent Cartesian dualism.  However, as before, his glosses on these quotes 
fail to grasp their role in speaking to cognitive psychologists without starting by dismissing 
their topic.  We have learned that that is a way to get nowhere fast. 
The key point, and the point that is most significant to us, is that Coulter pays no 
attention to the analysis (neither specific examples nor general practice) through which 
discursive psychology is defined and exemplified.  Surely the most effective and accurate 
way to understand our position is not to focus on our abstract claims about it (which are 
necessarily directed at a range of different audiences) but to consider how those claims are 
cashed out in practice.  Whatever we say about it, however much we use words that might be 
interpreted in a cognitivist fashion, does our practice reveal a Cartesian split between an inner 
world of cognition and an outer world of language and action?   We suggest that if Coulter 
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looks at these he will find a non-Cartesian position, although perhaps not precisely the one he 
favours. 
Overall, we are disappointed by Coulter’s reading of our work.  However, we hope 
we have highlighted some of the errors here (we could go on!).  For the rest of this discussion 
we prefer first to overview some elements of a discursive psychological approach to 
cognition, mental states and similar “mental” phenomena, and then consider some of the 
interesting substantive claims that Coulter makes. 
Themes in Discursive Psychology 
General programmatic features of discursive psychology have been outlined in a number of 
places.  The quote above from Edwards & Potter (1992) is still apposite in highlighting some 
of those features.  Compact recent summaries are available in Edwards & Potter (2002) and 
Potter & Edwards (2001a,b).  However, what is centrally at stake in this article is the status of 
cognition (or “cognition”). Let us state clearly and explicitly that discursive psychology deals 
with cognition in three related ways.   
1. Respecification and critique.  The focus here is on the respecification of 
psychological topics in terms of situated discourse practices.  This work takes topics 
from mainstream psychology and reworks them in terms of practices done through 
talk and text.  For example, Edwards & Potter (1992) includes a reconsideration of 
Ulric Neisser’s well known naturalistic study of John Dean’s memory as illustrated in 
the Watergate hearings and the Nixon Whitehouse tapes
3
.  We highlighted the way 
features of the discourse, which were taken by Neisser as documents of various 
underlying levels of information processing, could be better understood as elements 
of, or consequences of, particular discourse practices.  Work of this kind has taken a 
critical stance with respect to mainstream cognitive psychology.  However, it does 
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this not by arguing for the non-existence of mental objects, nor through research 
showing their non-existence.  We believe that neither of these approaches has been 
and will be very effective.  Rather our approach is methodological and epistemic.  We 
have done studies that cast doubt on the taken-for-granted methodic production of 
mental entities in cognitive psychological research.  
2. The psychological thesaurus.  The focus here is on the situated, occasioned, rhetorical 
uses of the commonsense lexicon of psychology.  This involves a study of the 
practical use of terms such as angry, jealous, believe, like, feel and so on.  For 
example, expressions such as “I don’t know”, or “your angry stage” have been studied 
for the local contrasts and interaction business they perform (e.g. Edwards, 1995; 
Potter, 1998).  These studies focus on actual materials, records of interaction in 
everyday and institutional settings.   
3. Managing psychological implications.   Much discursive psychological work has 
studied the way psychological themes are managed and handled without necessarily 
being overtly labelled.  We have studied how agency, intent, doubt, belief, prejudice, 
and so on, are built, made available, or countered “indirectly”, through descriptions of 
actions, events, objects, persons or settings.  This has been a key feature of the first 
type of discursive psychology, where attributions of intent and blame are shown to be 
handled, not by overt descriptions of intent or motive, but through what look like (or 
are produced as) straightforward event descriptions.  This is central in our exploration 
of “fact and accountability” (Potter & Edwards, 2001), where we show how factual 
descriptions are used to implicate a range of psychological states and attributions, and 
vice versa.  Again, such studies work with actual materials rather than invented or 
hypothetical examples. 
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All three of these themes in discursive psychology are at odds with the customary approach 
of modern cognitive and social psychology.  In numerous debates with more mainstream 
cognitive psychologists and social cognition researchers in formal, semi-formal and informal 
settings, we have not found that they have had any trouble recognizing and opposing the 
central anti-cartesian thrust to our proposals. 
Our work is also different in certain important respects to much current thinking in 
“social constructionism” (e.g. Harré & Gillett, 1994; Shotter, 1993).  These differences are 
often centred on issues of method and mind.  They are sometimes complex, and we will not 
try to explore them here.  However, one of us has produced a book length reconsideration of 
constructionism from a broadly discursive psychological approach (Potter, 1996).  This 
highlights our epistemic rather than ontological take on constructionism, and identifies points 
of contrast with other constructionist approaches.  Nevertheless, we hope we have done 
enough to show that Coulter’s simple reduction of our work to social constructionism in 
general is a mistake. 
What we have tried to do, then, is briefly illustrate the coherence of discursive 
psychology as a programme of work, and to show how Coulter’s criticisms are either wrong 
or based on a confused version of what the programme is.  In the final section of this article 
we will consider some of the substantive arguments that Coulter has raised. 
 
Substantive arguments  
We will try to end this discussion on a more constructive note.  Among other points he 
makes, Coulter raises two important and connected issues.  The first concerns the question of 
correct or incorrect everyday usage, and the related possibility of theoreticians or analysts 
checking or correcting such usage.  The second issue concerns the conceptual or empirical 
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basis that is appropriate for proper analysis, and discursive psychology’s take on that.  We 
quote Coulter at some length to show how he relates these issues together. 
…it may be argued that analysts of discourse and their allies, the “discursive 
psychologists”, are engaged in a purely empirical enterprise.  When they discuss 
“theoretical” issues pertaining to human mentality, however, inductive methods alone 
are unhelpful.  We do not need an empirical sample of instances of what various 
people happen to say about mental concepts and predicates, but rather we need 
examples of their use in engaged activities, what Wittgenstein (1968: para. 122) called 
an “ubersichtlichkeit Darstellung” – a “perspicuous representation”, involving the 
adducing of arrays of richly-described cases of conduct and relevant circumstances in 
and through which the concept or conceptual structures of interest can be revealed.  
Abstracted bits of empirically-sampled “discourse” will not help us here if they are 
chosen at random, since it is clear that people can, and do, misuse words on occasion, 
and may even do so in ways which are not locally corrected nor challenged by 
participant interlocutors.  Hence, although, of course, real-world cases are our 
preferred forms of instances, no purely empiricist or distributional criteria will suffice 
for our purposes of clarifying the grammars of our concepts: for that, we require to 
distinguish between intelligible vs. unintelligible uses, correct vs. incorrect, 
appropriate vs. inappropriate, etc… (Coulter, 1999: 171, original italics). 
Let us start with two brief passes though this quote.  First, let us note and discard some of the 
rhetorical finessing.  We do not need to take seriously the idea of studying examples of what 
people “happen to say” which have been “chosen at random” using “empiricist” criteria.  We 
are not familiar with too many analysts of discourse or otherwise who are made of quite so 
much straw.  Second, we may note and correct the reiteration of the misreadings of discursive 
psychology that have been documented in the previous two sections: in particular, the idea 
that discourse researchers work with what people say about mental concepts.  Putting those 
two points to one side, let us consider the key issues of correct usage and empirical research. 
They are at the nub of what distinguishes our approach from Coulter’s. 
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With respect to correct and incorrect usage, we do not see the role of discursive 
psychologists as identifying proper and improper usages of “mental words”.  We are 
interested in practices that use mental terms, and how those words are operating in those 
practices.  Criticizing participants for their possible misuse of words seems an odd thing for 
an analyst to do, echoing, somewhat ironically given the rejection of Cartesian cognitivism, 
the Chomskyan principle that has created such a profound and consequential difference in the 
materials taken seriously by cognitive psychologists and conversation analysts.  This 
warning, that participants may misuse their own terms, is notably unexplored via any cases 
where it “perspicuously” happens.  But it is also a dangerous principle on which to found an 
analytical methodology.  It may be, though it is unclear, that Coulter’s worry is restricted to 
the errors that people can make when offering disembedded theoretical assertions about 
language and mind; but such dubious items are not the stuff of DP. 
If we embark on a study of some kind of therapy or counselling talk, it is very likely 
to be imbued with what Coulter criticizes as “members’ own appropriations of cognitivist and 
mentalistic theorizing” (1999: 166).  There could be a lot to complain about, if we were 
aiming to criticize all such “appropriations”.  However, from our perspective it is perfectly 
coherent to study that interaction as a practice in broad terms and, more specifically, to 
consider the use of “mentalistic theorising4” in that practice.  Such an analysis does not 
require judgements about the correctness of the language use; rather it requires systematic 
study of how the practice is organized.  That their language use is intelligible in some sense 
or other is, in fact, required in order for Coulter to assert that people are mistaken. 
We have argued that discursive psychology is conducted most coherently from a 
stance of methodological relativism, similar to that used in many studies of science (e.g., 
Collins, 1983; Woolgar, 1988)
5
.  That is, for analytic purposes we are indifferent to the 
correctness, accuracy or whatever of what people are saying.  This allows studies of family 
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therapy in AIDS counselling (Peräkylä, 1995), or of stories about experiences with ghosts 
and poltergeists (Wooffitt, 1992), to be conducted without (a) the researcher having to 
believe in, say, Milan School family therapy or a paranormal world, and (b) having to be at 
least as expert as the participants in the relevant universe of ideas. 
The disagreement here is a sharp one.  For Coulter, any discourse purporting to be 
referring to private mental states is simply mistaken, and should be corrected.  For us, while 
recognizing the value of linguistic philosophy, and drawing on it in theoretical debates with 
psychologists from other approaches, we do not see it as appropriate to criticize member’s 
practices in the way suggested.  For example, there may be practices where there is some 
point to the idea of referring to private mental states, though not as the analyst’s favoured 
theory of language and mind.  Here the status of reference to internal mental states is not 
something to be refuted, even though it is conceptually refutable, but rather, studied as a 
practice within public forms of life. People may sometimes talk as if, or on the proposed and 
oriented-to basis, that their words are expressing inner thoughts and feelings.  It is a basis and 
orientation found in clinical psychology, for example, if we approach clinical attributions as 
studiable practices rather than rival theories of “mind”.  But it is found also in everyday talk, 
where again it is available for study as a social practice. It is also something that can be 
countered, not only by philosophical argument, but as part of everyday practices. People may 
point to inconsistencies, or to evidence to the contrary, or to disagreements, or to the 
speaker’s proposed strategic aims, and thus challenge any claim that they are merely 
reporting what they think. 
Coulter writes about how “mind” is not a “thing” of any kind that could be “talked 
into being” (1999: 169).  We have already noted that Coulter has ignored a crucial distinction 
between ontological and epistemic constructionism.  We are not proposing some “thing” that 
is talked into being.  Rather we are concerned with the operation of practices and the terms in 
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those practices.  However, the interesting thing here is how Coulter argues his point as it 
relates to the question of the status of empirical and conceptual research.  Note his use of 
invented, disembedded examples. 
“Mind” is either a lay notion, variously deployed, or a theorist’s reification. When 
vernacularly used, it is harmless enough: “she’s on my mind”, “it slipped my mind”, 
“he changes his mind”, and so forth, all have clear-cut, contextually-dependent 
vernacular paraphrases, none of which commit a speaker to any form of Cartesianism 
or neo-Cartesianism whatsoever.  (1999: 169, original italics). 
The interesting thing is this notion of “paraphrases”.  We acknowledge the value of 
paraphrases, of the kind that Coulter invokes, in making analytic-philosophical arguments. 
For example, Wittgenstein (1958) used them to demonstrate the impossibility of a “private 
language”, and (cf. Sacks, 1992) to show how any set of linguistic concepts and practices in 
use in any society have to be learnable via their situated uses.  But paraphrases are generally 
used (controversially) in philosophy, linguistics and stylistics (e.g., in standard treatments of 
“formal” and “informal” ways of saying “the same thing”), in ways that cut across situated, 
indexical, contrastive uses of particular expressions.  We may ask, what makes a paraphrase 
something equivalent in meaning?  How does its “contextually-dependent” nature retain its 
status as a paraphrase?  Is a notion of logical equivalence adequate here?  What is the basis of 
choice between these ostensible paraphrases, or are they generally equivalent for all practical 
purposes?  
Coulter’s appeal to paraphrases works by remaining in the realm of disembedded 
conceptual stipulation.  Yet surely the entire field of conversation analysis speaks to the 
dubiousness of any notion of a paraphrase as a useful analyst’s category.  It can only be a 
discourse practice to claim such a status for a description, that it is effectively equivalent to 
another; it can only be a defeasible, situated proposal or orientation of some kind, and worthy 
of study as such. 
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Of course, there are already some relevant studies, such as Heritage and Watson 
(1979) on “formulations”, a notion developed from Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) on the 
practice of “saying in so many words”.  When one set of words is offered in practice as 
equivalent to, or as the essence of, another set of words, there is likely to be something going 
on, some practice that the notion “paraphrase” merely obscures. In fact, being able to say 
something such as “he changes his mind” rather than, say, “he is inconsistent” (or whatever 
non-mentalistic paraphrase one might prefer), can have its uses.  We can start to hear a 
different range of accountability across such expressions.  Indeed they are different 
descriptions, different words that can do different things, which is probably why they are 
available.  A useful way into seeing what they do, would be to collect a set of instances of 
people offering re-descriptions that purport to be equivalent in some way.  We would expect 
such a study to evaporate the notion of “paraphrase” rather quickly. 
Coulter objects to Edwards’s (1997) use of the phrase “an act of remembering”, as if 
this implied underlying cognitions, ignoring the fact that the term was carefully chosen in 
contrast to what cognitive psychologists call “memory” (Edwards, Middeton & Potter, 1992) 
precisely to highlight the action of talking about the past, against expressing mental states.  
Coulter’s preferred, ostensibly non-mentalistic paraphrase is “an act of recounting a 
recollection” (1999: 168) which, it seems to us, merely begs the same questions. The Oxford 
English Dictionary (1992, 2
nd
 edition on CD-Rom), though clearly not written by Ryle, 
glosses “recollect” as “to call or bring back (something) to one’s mind”.  Whatever the merits 
of that definition, it is clear that merely substituting “recollection” for “remembering” fails on 
all counts.  Indeed, the notion that a “recollection” requires to be “recounted” suggests that it 
might be something other than the act of recounting; Coulter’s preferred terminology seems 
even more problematical than ours.  See Edwards & Potter (in press) for further discussion. 
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Let us move on from considering problems with Coulter’s notion of a paraphrase to 
the kind of (made up) examples that he asks us to consider.  Again, we recognize the central 
value of invented examples in theoretical linguistics and in philosophy.  However, our 
preferred approach is to look for actual cases in actual materials.  Whether this should be 
considered an “empirical” move or not is unclear; we certainly reject the implication that it 
implies a commitment to the philosophy of “empiricism”.  Coulter also stresses the 
importance of such materials: “of course, real-world cases are our preferred forms of 
instances” (see the larger quotation above), but his concern is to apply “grammatical” 
analysis which will “distinguish between intelligible vs. unintelligible uses, correct vs. 
incorrect, appropriate vs. inappropriate, etc., uses vs. misuses” (1999: 171).  Yet his 
preference is not displayed in his article by a rich use of “real-world” cases.  On the contrary, 
he produces invented, normatively intelligible examples in which people are taken to “assert” 
(166) things or make “empirical claims” (172). 
One of the problems of using idealized examples (i.e., definitively correct ones, free 
from the vicissitudes of what Chomsky calls “performance”), as examples of actual social 
practices, is that it easily lends itself to a strange notion of what people are up to when they 
say things.  It tends towards a treatment of people as making definitive assertions, and as 
talking theoretically.  For those very reasons, as well as the avoidance of situated 
contingencies, it is an analytic practice much favoured in cognitivist treatments of language 
and meaning. 
Nevertheless, the following is a “real-world” case.  It is taken from a telephone 
helpline for reporting child abuse.  The caller has been describing problems with her male 
partner that may relate to events in his childhood.  We are particularly interested in the 
arrowed turn (line 18) where the child protection officer (CPO) talks about something in the 
back of the caller’s mind. 
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NSPCC BN 15
6
 
1 
2 
3 
Caller: …I said to him y’know is- is it is it thi:s. 
(.) .hh and he said I was not to ever mention 
that aga:in. .hhh W(h)ellhh= 
4 CPO: =It's extraordinary. 
5 
6 
Caller: VEry extra(h)ordinary.= I’ve just .h ih he got 
very very a:ngry when [I mentioned that.]= 
7 CPO:                        [ Defensive?      ] 
8 
9 
10 
Caller: =An I did- .hh v:very. Yes. 
(0.8) 
A- and that bothered me too:.   
11 
12 
CPO: um 
(0.6) 
13 
14 
Caller: I mean- I I don’t rea:lly know what we’re 
dea:ling with here. 
15 CPO: .pt [ .hhhhh         ] 
16 Caller:     [I really don’t.] 
17  (0.5) 
18  
19 
20 
CPO: .hhhh In the- very back of your mi:nd were you 
sort of toying with the idea that somehow your 
husband may have had (.) 
21 Caller: I don’t know.   
22  (0.5)   
23 Caller: I don’t know. 
24 
25 
CPO: No you don’t know but are [you playing with 
the idea:] 
26 
27 
28 
Caller:                           [((coughs)) I 
possibly ] I possibly am.= I possibly am. 
(0.3) 
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29 
30 
CPO: Y:eh. 
(0.6) 
31 
32 
Caller: Now e- it’d bring back all sorts of doubts 
doesn’t it [within] families. 
33 CPO:            [Ye:h ] 
34  (1.3) 
 
In line 18 the child protection officer
7
 uses the phrase “in the very back of your 
mind”.  We do not want to go into too much detail about its operation here.  Suffice it to say 
that the counsellor may be delicately orienting to the possibility that the caller is concerned 
that her husband had been involved with sexual abusing family members when younger, but 
is reluctant to make that concern explicit.  Or she may have come independently to such a 
possibility.  Either way, by offering the construction that the caller may have been “toying 
with the idea” at the “back of your mind” she is able to present this as something that may or 
may not be being claimed or implied by the caller, while orienting to the fact that she has not 
explicitly and directly made such a claim up that point (over 43 minutes into the call).  The 
counsellor thereby rather delicately moves on to talking about this issue.  The mentalistic 
appeal, to unspoken thoughts in the head, is one practical and intelligible means available for 
doing this. 
The point we want to note is that “the back of your mind” could be paraphrased in a 
non-Cartesian manner.  But would such a paraphrase help?  In what useful sense would it be 
equivalent?  It would be confusing for the actual analysis, which is surely best done on the 
words uttered rather than on some different words.  Moreover, what would be the justification 
for such a paraphrase?  Ought we to take the counsellor as making some kind of 
philosophical assertion about the location of mental states, which might usefully be clarified 
by paraphrasing it as a behavioural disposition?  Would the paraphrase then be taken to be 
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what the counsellor “really means” in line 18?  The problem is that we would then be starting 
to make a classic cognitivist move, of seeing speech as a consequence of underlying 
intentions.  If we asked the counsellor to do her own paraphrase she might well produce a 
cognitivist one; after all she is trained in counselling where such cognitivism is 
commonplace. But substituting a paraphrase seems to us to be arbitrary, ironic, confused, and 
ultimately rather peculiar.  We much prefer to study these actual words in their actual 
environment, and examine what they accomplish as common sense expressions. 
This relates to another of Coulter’s complaints, which is that discourse analysts 
believe in the “indefinite discursive flexibility or ‘negotiability’ of meanings” (1999: 172, 
original italics).  For Coulter this “is not a matter of empiricism – of empirical adjudication 
based on appeals to whatever anyone might have actually said – but of logico-grammatical 
argument based on perspicuous instances of use” (1999: 172).  Yet this depends on what the 
aim of analysis is.  In our case it is not to identify “correct usage” but to study actual usage.  
Actual usage can involve a rhetorical finessing, working up, creative sequencing and 
construction of languages’ resources to make claims, descriptions or accounts ‘work’.  
Indeed, what counts as “correct usage” is something that itself can be up for dispute or 
reworking in interaction.  Our point is that “correct usage” is by no means a straightforward 
criterion that stands outside of specific analysis. That is one of the things that has been 
documented in a wide range of studies.  Coulter may claim that such examples are mistakes 
or incorrect in some way.  However, the onus is surely on him to show this with these 
examples rather than merely state that this is the case. 
Should discursive psychology be an empirical or a logical study?  Coulter has pressed 
the virtues of logical or grammatical analysis.  We do not believe that there is such a strong 
opposition to be made here, when it comes to analytic practice.  Coulter glosses empirical 
research as research focused on the generation of statistical regularities (here “distributional 
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criteria”).  His claim that discursive psychology is empirical in this way is wide of the mark.  
A central element in the development of discursive psychology has been its critique of 
precisely such empirical approaches in experimental social psychology.  Discursive 
psychology works through collections of instances, the close study of deviant cases and a 
major focus on participants’ orientations (see Potter, in press).  Yet clearly analysis of this 
kind cannot be adequately performed without the analyst drawing on their native linguistic 
competence.  
Rather than come down on one side of the logic vs. empirical distinction, however, 
we would suggest two things.  First, sociological studies of scientific knowledge show that 
empiricism itself – whether in physics or biochemistry or elsewhere – is a rather complicated 
thing, particularly when it is itself studied as part of practices and accounts, rather than as an 
abstraction about them (see Knorr Cetina, 1999).  Second, it may be more useful to consider 
our respective analytic practices rather than what we write about them – i.e., what we claim 
about specific instances of language use, and how our claims are grounded.  We tend to spend 
more time collecting and analysing actual examples, while Coulter tends to spend more time 
inventing illustrations for his arguments. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1
  We are tempted to put scare quotes around all our uses of these terms lest we are 
treated as having the belief that the words have inner referents simply on the basis of 
using the words themselves. 
 
2
  We are aware that we might be understood as making an ontological claim about 
some inner stuff here.  For the record, again, we note that we do not take our study of 
the practice of describing, avowing, or attributing mental entities as committing us to 
the endorsement (or, in itself, of the denial) of such things.   
 
3
  This work has a number of similarities to Lynch & Bogen’s study Oliver North and 
his memory (Lynch & Bogen, 1996; in press).    
 
4
  Although we would be unlikely to treat it as “theorizing”, as if it thereby stood in 
some abstract relationship to the action.  This points to another difference between our 
take on members’ uses of mental predicates, and Coulter’s notion of people 
“asserting” and “theorizing” matters, as if they were engaged in some form of 
philosophizing in opposition to Wittgenstein. 
 
5
  We are aware, of course, that Button & Sharrock (1992), who sometimes work in a 
similar vein to Coulter, have criticized this tradition of work.  For a detailed 
commentary and rebuttal of that critique see Potter (1996: 219-23). 
 
6
  This material was collected as part of a joint project with Alexa Hepburn.  We would 
like to thank her and the NSPCC for permission to use it. 
 
7
  This is the NSPCC job description for their call-takers.  We are not wanting to imply 
further about her actions than that. 
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